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FOREWORD-THE BURGER COURT 1971 TERM: ONE STEP FORWARD,
TWO STEPS BACKWARD?
Arthur J. Goldberg*
The Burger Court,' in its criminal law decisions
of the October 1971 Term, on occasion confounded
both its critics and protagonists. This is equally
true of its decisions in other areas. Thus, by way
of example, in the criminal law area it struck down
the Administration's domestic wiretapping pro-
gram.2 In dealing with the first amendment's
safeguard of the free exercise of religion, the Court
held that the Amish need not comply with Wis-
consin's compulsory formal education requirement
after the eighth grade; compliance, in the Court's
view, was inconsistent with the free exercise of
their religious beliefs.3 In both cases the decisions
were written by President Nixon's appointees-
justice Powell in the wiretapping case, and Chief
Justice Burger in the Amish case.
But in a larger number of decisions4--criminal
* B.S.L., 1929, J.D., 1930, Northwestern University.
Former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States and United States Ambassador to the United
Nations.
I wish to gratefully acknowledge the assistance of
Mr. Larry E. Shapiro, J.D., 1971, Georgetown Uni-
versity, in the preparation of this manuscript.
IMy reference to the Burger Court is intended to
denote the era of the Supreme Court's history begin-
ning with the appointment of Chief Justice Warren
Burger to the Court.
2United States v. United States District Court,
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
' Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 2 (1972).
'See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (the
four Nixon appointees plus Stewart, J., limit right to
counsel at lineups to post-indictment lineups); Gelbard
v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 71 (1972) (dissent from
holding that grand jury witness cited for contempt may
invoke use of illegal wiretapping as a defense); Loper
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 485, 494, 497 (1972) (dissents
from holding that evidence of convictions obtained
where defendant was denied right to counsel cannot be
used for impeachment purposes); Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143 (1972) (Nixon appointees, joined by White
and Stewart, JJ., sanction police search based on uncor-
roborated information from informer); Wright v. Coun-
cil of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 471 (1972)
(dissent from holding that city could not constitu-
tionally withdraw from county school system and es-
tablish separate system where effect was to substan-
tially increase segregation of the races); Lloyd Corp. v.
law and otherwise-either in majority or in dissent,
President Nixon's appointees proved themselves
to be the "strict constructionists" (whatever that
term means) favored by their Presidential sponsor.
Thus, all four joined in upholding split jury ver-
dicts in state criminal trials; 5 dissented against
the Court's decisions invalidating the present
system of imposing the death penalty;6 and united
in holding that the first amendment does not afford
a newspaperman the constitutional privilege to
withhold facts relevant to a grand jury's investi-
gation of a crimeY
An analysis of these and other decisions of the
1971 Term shows that it is conceivable if another
vacancy on the Court should occur during Presi-
dent Nixon's tenure, that his five appointees-
then a majority of the Court-might join to over-
rule significant criminal law and other forward-
looking decisions of the Warren Court. This would
be highly regrettable, both on the merits and be-
cause of the "Court packing" implications of
such a result.
There is, however, some evidence in the decisions
of the last Term,8 and ample evidence in the his-
tory of the Court, that this may not necessarily
occur. Supreme Court justices throughout history
have been notable in not slavishly following the
viewpoint of the President who appointed them.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (Nixon appointees and
White, J., hold that privately owned shopping center
could prevent distribution of antiwar handbills).
6 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca
v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).6Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
7 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
8 See notes 2-3 supra, and accompanying text. See
also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (unani-
mous opinion holding that right to counsel extends to
misdemeanor prosecutions); Mayer v. City of Chicago,
404 U.S. 189 (1971) (unanimous opinion extending right
to adequate record of trial to misdemeanor cases);
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (excessive filing
fees for candidates for election unanimously held to
violate equal protection clause; Powell and Rehnquist,
JJ., not participating).
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An outstanding example is Mr. Justice Holmes'
opinion in the Northern Securities9 case, which
so dismayed President Theodore Roosevelt that
the previously cordial social relationships between
the President and the Justice were permanently
ruptured.
Time alone will provide the answer as to whether
the Burger Court will indeed turn back the judicial
dock. I trust that this will not occur, both for
the sake of the Court and the Nation.
Let us look at the decisions themselves as a
portent for the future. In a foreword the treatment
must necessarily be summary; the student notes
which follow will provide detailed analysis and
amplification of a number of the cases handed
down this Term.
In dealing with decisions of the Supreme Court,
or, for that matter, any court, in the criminal law
area, judges should be mindful of the humanitarian
approach of Sir Winston Churchill, expressed
more than sixty years ago when he occupied the
office of Home Secretary. On July 20, 1910, in a
speech delivered in the House of Commons, that
great statesman and politician said:
The mood and temper of the public in regard to
the treatment of crime and criminals is one of the
most unfailing tests of any country. A calm, dis-
passionate recognition of the rights of any accused,
and even of the convicted criminal, against the
State-a constant heart-searching by all charged
with the duty of punishment-a desire and eager-
ness to rehabilitate in the world of industry those
who have paid their due in the hard coinage of
punishment: tireless efforts towards the discovery
of curative and regenerative processes: unfailing
faith that there is a treasure, if you can find it, in
the heart of every man. These are symbols, which,
in the treatment of crime and the criminal, mark
and measure the stored up strength of a nation,
and are sign, and proof of the living virtue within
it.o
The Supreme Court, during Earl Warren's ten-
ure as Chief Justice, attempted to decide criminal
cases in this spirit which is reflected in the pro-
visions of our Bill of Rights. It is the criminal law
decisions of the Warren Court which are most
frequently attacked, for a variety of reasons. First,
there is a justifiable concern in our country about
the increase in crime; some mistakenly believe
that the increase is somehow linked to the expan-
9 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
10Quoted in A. GOLUBERG, EQUAL JusTicE: THE
WARREN ERA or THE SuPRsxa CoURT 12-13 (1970).
sion of constitutional safeguards for criminal
defendants. Second, "Take the handcuffs off the
police" is a profitable political slogan. Third, a
number of scholars are urging a reversal of such
rights. And fourth, the criminal decisions do not
necessarily share the compelling moral considera-
tions of the Court's civil rights decisions, the ma-
joritarian popularity of the Reapportionment
cases, or the emerging popular appeal of free
speech, press, and privacy cases 1
There are two other pertinent criteria by which
criminal law decisions of both the Warren and
the Burger Courts should be measured. First, it
should be asked whether the Court has dealt in
realities, and not legal fictions. Examples of dealing
in realities are the Warren Court's decisions in
the reapportionment area12 and the cases which
sought to eliminate the invidious effects of poverty
on individuals' constitutional rights when facing
the administration of justice.11
The second criterion deals with the role of con-
stitutional stare decisis. I believe that here stare
decisis traditionally applies with a ratchet-like
effect-that when the Supreme Court is urged to
overrule in order to cut back the individual's fun-
damental constitutional protections against gov-
ernmental interference, the commands of stare
decisis are all but absolute; but when the Court
overrules to expand personal liberties, the doctrine
imposes a markedly less restrictive caution 4
There are a number of compelling reasons for
courts to hesitate in overruling prior decisions.
In a very real sense stare decisis fosters public
confidence in the judiciary and public acceptance
of individual decisions by giving the assurance
of impersonal consistent opinions.15 Second, the
concept buttresses judges against their own nat-
ural tendencies and prejudices.16 Furthermore,
stare decisis eases the judicial burden by encourag-
ing private settlements of disputes and by facilitat-
ing decisions once such suits are brought. 7
n Id. at 7-8.
12 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).1 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)
(state must provide counsel for indigent defendants in
felony cases); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)
(indigents must be provided trial transcript to insure
equal access to appellate process).
i4 A. GOLDBERG, supra note 10, at 96.
See generally C. HuGHEs, T3E SurPRm- CoURT or
TnE UNrED STArEs 52 (1928).
iS See A. BIcKEL, THE SuRamB CouRT AND Tm
IDEA OF PROGRESS 82 (1970).
7 See B. CA-nozo, Tan NATURE or TnE JuDiciAL
PRocEss 149 (1937).
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Despite these compelling reasons, in the area
of constitutionally protected personal liberties
there traditionally has been room for flexibility
in the doctrine. The constitutional safeguards of
our fundamental liberties were instilled with an
innate capacity for growth to enable them to meet
new evils. This was probably best stated by Jus-
tice McKenna in Weems v. United States,1' a case
in which the Court struck down as cruel and un-
usual punishment a harsh and inhuman penalty
known as cadena temporal, then used in the Philip-
pines Territory:
Time works changes, brings into existence new con-
ditions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be
vital must be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth. This is pecuharly
true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral
enactments, designed to meet passing occasions.
They are, to use the words of Chief justice Mar-
shall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly
as human institutions can approach it." The future
is their care and provision for events of good and
bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made.
In the application of a constitution, therefore, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been
but of what may be. Under any other rule a con-
stitution would indeed be as easy of application
as it would be deficient in efficacy and power. Its
general.principles would have little value and be
converted by precedent into impotent and life-
less formulas. Rights declared in words might be
lost in reality. t9
It is interesting to note that Weems is a much relied
upon precedent in the several opinions in the recent
death penalty cases.
2'
When a contraction of fundamental rights is
urged upon the Court, the reasons for employing
stare decisis apply with undiminished force. In
fact, other factors indicate that the doctrine gains
strength when the Court contemplates overruling
in order to cut back on personal liberties. One
such factor is that the doctrine aids the Court in
protecting against a tyranny of the majority.
Constitutional guarantees are generally rights of
politically impotent minorities." The danger of
the Court bowing to public pressure by cutting
- 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
19 Id. at 373.
"1 See, e.g., 408 U.S. at 261-82 (Brennan, J., con-
curring); id. at 325-44 (Marshall, J., concurring); id.
at 383-94 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 424-33,
451-64 (Powell, J., dissenting).
2" See Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial
Review, 17 CAmH. U.L. R v. 20, 40 (1967); 'Rostow, The
Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 HAnv. L.
REv. 193, 202 (1952).
back on the rights of unpopular minorities is ame-
liorated by constitutional stare decisis. Another
factor weighing in favor of the application of the
doctrine in this area is the symbolic importance
of Supreme Court pronouncements. The Court,
in effect, sets, to a large extent, a moral tone for
the country. Giving official sanction to a contrac-
tion of fundamental rights can only have a dele-
terious effect on the country as a whole. Surely a
contrary result in the death penalty cases would
have had such an effect."
Furman v. Georgia" is a prime example illustra-
tive of my theory of constitutional stare decisis.
Here the Court held the death penalty to be un-
constitutional, at least in the setting presented by
this case and its companions. When I was on the
Court, I could but muster two other votes (us-
tices Douglas and Brennan) for even granting
certiorari to consider the constitutionality of the
death penalty as imposed upon a convicted rapist
who had neither taken nor endangered life. 4 In
Furman, five Justices for varying reasons held
the death penalty, as traditionally applied, un-
constitutional. It is true that the five were hold-
overs from the Warren Court and the four dis-
senters were President Nixon's appointees. But
nevertheless a majority not available during the
Warren era became available on the Burger Court.
Indeed, as Justice McKenna said in Weems, "time
works changes."'
25
Furman is a great step forward in the Court's
and our country's history. This is true despite
the much commented upon limitations of the
case. Six to seven hundred persons on death row
will not be executed. Our country will not have to
endure the barbaric notion of mass hangings, gas-
sings, and electrocutions being carried out under
the auspices of law enforcement. And while Justice
Stewart's and Justice White's opinions might per-
mit the imposition of the death penalty, if imposed
less arbitrarily than as now, it is extremely doubt-
ful that it will be legislatively revised. As it now
stands, the Court has made a great contribution
to what Camus has termed the "great civilizing
step."2
6
"2See Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death
Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HAnv. L. Rv. 1773
(1970).
-406 U.S. 238 (1972).
24 See Rudolph v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 889 (1963),
denying cert. to 275 Ala. 115, 152 So. 2d 662 (Brennan,
Douglas, and Goldberg, JJ., dissenting).
21217 U.S. at 273.
26 A. CAmus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in Rxslsr-
ANcE, REBELLION AND DEATH 232 (1961).
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Another significant advance in safeguarding fun-
damental constitutional rights was taken by the
Court in the wiretapping area. In a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court held,
in United States v. United States District Court,
2 7
that the Attorney General may not authorize
electronic surveillance of domestic subversives
without prior judicial approval. Justice Powell wrote
that the fourth amendment normally requires a
warrant for all searches, and that this situation
is not an exception. This decision goes a long way
toward restoring warrants for searches and arrests
to their rightful place in the law. I share Justice
Jackson's view that greater value should be placed
upon searches and seizures accomplished through
the use of warrants than searches without a war-
rant s In writing this opinion, the Court is asking
magistrates to fulfill the mandate that they not
operate as rubber stamps for police and prosecutors
in issuing warrants. They should in fact act as
detached, neutral magistrates; all too often in the
past this has not been the case.
There are, however, some troubling points about
United States v. United States District Court. First,
there is the intimation, particularly in Justice
White's concurrence, 2 that Congress could autho-
rize warrantless domestic electronic surveillance
by the Executive Branch. In my view, however,
Congress cannot legislate away the fourth amend-
ment. Second, surveillance of domestic subversives
was distinguished by Justice Powell from surveil-
lance of foreign subversives. 3 This latter practice,
which admittedly is different, should be carefully
safeguarded since it may be easily abused under
the unsubstantiated claim of national security.
The Court's decision in Argersinger v. Hainlini
is another example of the expansion of fundamental
rights during this Term. Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority, held that the right of an indigent
defendant in a criminal trial to the assistance of
2 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
28 The point of the fourth amendment, which is not
often grasped by zealous officers, is not that it
denies law enforcement officers the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
the evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)
(Jackson, J.). See also United States v. Ventresca, 380
U.S. 102, 105-07 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 110-11 (1964).
20407 U.S. at 325.
20 Id. at 308.
31407 U.S. 25 (1972).
counsel, guaranteed by the sixth amendment, and
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth
amendment in Gideon v. Wainwrigt,n is not gov-
erned by the classification of the offense. No ac-
cused may be deprived of his liberty as the result
of any criminal prosecution, whether felony or mis-
denteanor, without benefit of counsel. This is a
logical and realistic expansion of the right to coun-
sel, particularly in light of the fact that the ques-
tions involved in a misdemeanor case will often
be as complex as those in a felony charge and the
ultimate result may be incarceration in jail, albeit
for a shorter term. Justices Powell and Rehnquist
concurred in the result of the case but indicated
that they would leave to judicial discretion the
decision as to whether counsel is required in a given
case. I have long felt that discretion, in the criminal
law area, all too often is synonymous with an
abnegation of law. Leaving discretion to the courts
is permissible and even desirable in equity pro-
ceedings, but has little place in a criminal trial.
Indeed, in Furman v. Georgia,1 the arbitrary dis-
cretion left to judges and juries in applying the
death penalty proved fatal to it in Justice White's
and Stewart's opinions.4
Two other cases which logically extended Gideon
are United States v. Tucker32 and Loper v. Beto. 6
These cases held, respectively, that convictions
obtained in violation of Gideon could not be con-
sidered by a judge in sentencing a convicted crimi-
nal, nor could such convictions be used to impeach
a defendant. In light of the policy of Gideon and
its retroactive scope, the Court rightly reached
the above conclusions. Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun dissented in Tucker (Justices
Powell and Rehnquist taking no part in the de-
cision), while all four Nixon-appointed Justices
dissented in Loper.
Relevant justicen was the byword in Gooding v.
Wilson.n3 A Georgia statute made the use of "op-
probrious words or abusive language" in another's
presence without provocation, a crime. The Court
viewed past decisions by Georgia courts as not
having narrowed the statute to apply only to
"fighting" words, which by their very utterance
tend to invite an immediate breach of the peace.
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
408 U.S. 238 (1972).
I41d. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring); id. at 309-
10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
35 404 U.S.- 443 (1972).
20405 U.S. 518 (1972).
3 A. Go=sEG, supra note 10, at 3-31.
32405 U.S. 518 (1972).
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Therefore, the statute was held to be unconstitu-
tionally vague and overbroad on its face under
the first and fourteenth amendments. Chief justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun dissented, arguing
that a commonsense analysis of the statute per-
mitted but one interpretation of the statute's
language, that being a requirement of fighting
words. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no
part in the decision.
Eisenstadt v. Baird9 dealt with the right of
unmarrieds to obtain birth control devices. Al-
though the Court did not define the right of privacy
involved, but, instead, based its decision on the
equal protection grounds that married individuals
were permitted to obtain such devices, the Court
did note that a right of privacy exists. Thus, the
Court was carrying forward from where the Warren
Court had left off in Griswold v. Connecticut.0
Chief Justice Burger dissented and Justices Powell
and Rehnquist took no part in the decision. I take
particular satisfaction that, in a related case,
Justice White,0 writing for a majority of the Court,
referred to the ninth amendment which I sought
to revitalize in my concurring opinion in Griswold.2
The Court also dealt with discrimination in
the jury selection process and held, in Peters
v. Kiffs that due process is denied when a de-
fendant is subjected to indictment by a grand jury,
or trial by petit jury, which has been selected in
an arbitrary and discriminatory manner. It further
held, in Alexander v. Louisiana," that a defendant
made out a prima facie case of invidious discrimi-
nation in the selection of the grand jury which
indicted him, through the use of statistics showing
an unrepresentative proportion of blacks on his
venire. In Kiff, the Court noted that a Caucasian
could raise the issue of the exclusion of blacks
from his jury since such exclusion destroys the
representativeness of a jury and casts doubt upon
the integrity of the entire judicial process. During
my tenure on the Bench, I said, in dissent in Swain
v. Alabama,45 that the use of peremptory challenges
to keep blacks off a jury is unconstitutional, for
39 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
4 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (law prohibiting use of contra-
Aceptives unconstitutionally invades marital right of
privacy).
"1 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (unwed
father entitled to hearing before children can be taken
from him after mother's death).
42381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldberg, 3., concurring).
43 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
"405 U.S. 625 (1972).
Is 380 U.S. 202, 228-47 (1965) (Goldberg, 3., dissent-
ing).
much the same reasons relied upon by the majority
in Kiff. The virtue of Kiff and Alexander is that
they return to the true faith of Strauder v. West
Virginia,4 from which Swain departed. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehn-
quist dissented from the majority position in Kiff.
In Mayer v. City of Chicago,0 the Court took
one more step in attempting to eliminate the effect
of poverty on criminal justice. In Draper v. Wash-
ington,4 the Warren Court held that a state must
afford an indigent defendant, in a felony case, a
trial record of sufficient completeness to permit
proper consideration of his claims on appeal. -In
Mayer, the current Court, in a unanimous opinion
extended this right to defendants convicted on
non-felony charges. This decision is a step forward
from Draper. Surely the time has come, however,
to go further and order a transcript in all cases,
inasmuch as bills of exception are often difficult
to settle and the real flavor of a trial can only be
discerned in a complete trial record.
An expansion of fundamental rights also oc-
curred in the Court's decision in Brooks v. Tennes-
see." A Tennessee statute required a defendant
in a criminal proceeding to testify, if he wished to
testify at all, before any other testimony for the
defense was heard. Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, held that such a statute was an un-
constitutional infringement on one's privilege
against self-incrimination. Thus the right against
self-incrimination was expanded to include the
right of a defendant to testify, if he so elects, at
any time during the presentation of his case. Any
other rule, Justice Brennan noted, would be an
impermissible restriction on the defendant's right
to remain silent until he chooses to speak and to
suffer no penalty for such silence. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist
dissented.
Three other expansive decisions of the Court
this Term bear noting. The right of a grand jury
witness to invoke as a defense to a contempt charge
the fact that the government obtained its informa-
tion concerning him through a warrantless wire-
tapping was established in Gelbard v. United
States." Although the decision is based on a pro-
vision of Title IlI of the Omnibus Crime Control
46100 U.S. 303 (1880) (state statute prohibiting
blacks from serving on juries held unconstitutional).
47404 U.S. 189 (1971).
- 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
4 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
60408 U.S. 41 (1972).
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and Safe Streets Act of 1968,"' it in effect expands
the fourth amendment protection against warrant-
less searches and seizures. Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist,
in dissent, took the position that the 1968 Crime
Control Act was designed to limit the rights of
criminal defendants, not expand them.
In Morrissey v. Brewer, 2 the Court unanimously,
through Chief Justice Burger, held that a parolee
is entitled to a full due process hearing prior to
parole revocation. This is a major advance in the
area of criminal justice.
The third case is Groppi v. Leslie,3 in which
the Court unanimously, through Chief Justice
Burger, held that the due process right to notice
and a hearing extends to those persons cited for
contempt by state legislatures. Historically, the
whole concept of contempts being tried by legis-
latures stems from the fact that in Great Britain
the Houses of Parliament, and particularly the
House of Lords with its Law Lords, are considered
judicial bodies, and thus possess the contempt
power. Our Congress, however, is differently con-
stituted. Further, Great Britain is lacking in a
written Bill of Rights expressly restricting legis-
lative powers. It seems obvious that Congress
and state legislatures are not equipped to try con-
tempt cases, much less without giving the alleged
contemnor notice or an opportunity to defend
himself. Indeed, Congress itself has wisely recog-
nized that this is so by remitting contempt of
Congress cases to the courts for trial.%
At the outset I commented that on occasion the
Burger Court during its last Term confounded its
admirers, and the cases to which I have above
referred demonstrate that the Burger Court is not
invariably as "strict constructionist" as some of
its proponents anticipated. 5  I also pointed out,
however, that in a considerable number of de-
cisions the Burger Court confirmed some of the
61 18 U.S.C. §2515 (1970) requires that any illegally
intercepted communication, or any evidence derived
therefrom, cannot be admitted in any proceeding
before a grand jury. The Court read this provision to
provide a defense to a contempt citation issued for
refusal to answer questions before the grand jury.
"407 U.S. 297 (1972).
"404 U.S. 496 (1972).
2 U.S.C. §§192-94 (1970).
55 The term "strict constructionist" has more popu-
lar appeal than value for explaining actions by the
Court. The proponents of the Burger Court are proba-
bly really interested in "judicial restraint" as opposed
to "judicial activism." See A. GoLnBE:RG, supra note
10, at 35-63.
fears of its critics. It is to these decisions that I
now turn.
The Warren Court's landmark decision in
Miranda v. Arizona56 was cut back during the
1970 Term 7 Another example of retreat from
decisions of the Warren Court occurred in the 1971
Term in Kirby v. Illinois.n Previously, in United
States v. Wade5 and Gilbert v. California,"0 the
Warren Court had held that a defendant was en-
titled to an attorney when he was forced to take
part in a lineup. In the Kirby case, Justice Stewart,
writing for himself and the Chief Justice and
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, held
that the Wade decision was based upon the de-
fendant's right to counsel at every critical stage of
the prosecution. Under his view, no critical stage
is reached until formal charges are brought, and
a majority of the Court held that a defendant is
not entitled to an attorney at a pre-indictment
lineup.n This rationale obviously cuts back on
Wade and Gilbert, which made no distinction be-
tween pre-indictment and post-indictment lineups.
The holding also denies to defendants the right to
counsel when the adversary process first focuses
upon them, as guaranteed in Escobedo v. Illinois.0
Justices Douglas, Marshall, Brennan, and White
dissented, noting that the right to counsel, guar-
anteed by Escobedo, is a pragmatic necessity at the
accusatorial stage if the defendant is to have a
fair opportunity to present a defense at the trial
itself. They also pointed out that the majority was
incorrect in its position that Escobedo was based
on fifth amendment grounds. This case exorcised
as much from the body and spirit of Escobedo as
the Court's decision last Term in Harris v. New
York did from Miranda.
In Johnson v. Louisiana" and Apodaca v. Ore-
gon 65 the Court held that neither the sixth amend-
ment nor the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment guaranteed the right to a unanimous
56384 U.S. 346 (1966) (statements of accused made
during police custodial interrogation excluded from
evidence unless accused informed of right to counsel
and right to remain silent and rights waived).
17 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (state-
ment obtained in violation of Miranda can be used to
impeach defendant's trial testimony).
"406 U.S. 682 (1972).
59 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
388 U.S. 263 (1967).61 Justice Powell provided the fifth and deciding
vote on the basis that Wade and Gilbert should not
be extended. 406 U.S. at 691.
2378 U.S: 478 (1964).
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
406 U.S. 356 (1972).
65 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
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jury in state criminal trials. In Johnson, Justice
White, writing for himself, the Chief Justice, and
Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, held
that the reasonable doubt requirement derived
from the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, as established and recognized in In
re Winship'6 does not require a unanimous verdict.
In my estimation, our jury system is seriously
undermined by this decision. We have long recog-
nized that it is far better to occasionally allow a
guilty person to go free than to chance unjustly
punishing innocent defendants. Hence, we have
the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" require-
ment. The decision in Johnson appears to move
away from this philosophy and toward the position
that it is more important that the guilty be con-
victed. Moreover, the decision will tend to dis-
courage an essential ingredient in our criminal
justice system: considered deliberation by the jury.
Juries are now allowed to count heads as to a ver-
dict rather than forced to closely examine the evi-
dence to reach a unanimous conclusion.
In Apodaca, the Chief Justice and Justices
White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist said that the
sixth amendment, although applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment, does
not require a unanimous verdict. Justice Powell,
in concurring and supplying the deciding vote,
held that the sixth amendment does require unani-
mous verdicts in federal cases, but when applied
to the states through the fourteenth does not in-
corporate a unanimity requirement.Y This is an
adoption of the late Justice Harlan's concept of a
watered-down incorporation of the Bill of Rights
when applied to the states. This theory has been
rejected by the Court on a number of occasions in
the past.3
Voluntariness hearings in confession cases was
the subject matter of Lego v. Twomey.6 9 In Jackson
v. Denno7° the Warren Court held that the trial
66 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
67406 U.S. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring).
6 See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)
(double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment
applies to the states); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 149 (1968) (sixth amendment right of jury trial
applies to states); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11
(1964) (fifth amendment privilege against self in-
crimination applies to states). See also Ohio ex rd.
Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (1960) (opinion of
Brennan, J.).
69 40: U.S. 477 (1972).
"378 U.S. 368 (1968). For a comprehensive pre-Lego
analysis of the right to a Jackson v. Denno voluntariness
hearing, see Comment, An Examination of the Right to
a Voluntariness Hearing, 63 J. Calr. L.C. & P.S. 30
(1972).
judge must hold a hearing, out of the jury's pres-
ence, to determine the voluntariness of a defend-
ant's confession. In the Twomey case the current
Court held that the standard of proof required to
be used in such a hearing is "a preponderance of
the evidence" and not "beyond a reasonable
doubt." In Jackson, the Court did not specifically
address itself to the proper evidentiary standard.
A logical application of Jackson would have led to
a "reasonable doubt" standard. The procedure
established in Jackson was designed to safeguard
the right of an accused not to be compelled to
condemn himself by his own utterances. The pro-
cedure was designed to entitle the defendant "to a
reliable and clear-cut determination that the con-
fession was in fact voluntarily rendered." n The
rationale of Jackson leads to the conclusion that
only the "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" stand-
ard adequately protects against the danger that
involuntary confessions will be employed in crim-
inal trials. Realistically, Twomey cuts back on
Jackson.
Adams v. Williamsn presented the Court with
the difficult problem of reconciling the right of
individuals to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures against the need to give policemen
reasonable latitude in exercising their duties. The
case dealt with the Terry v. Ohio7' exception to the
probable cause requirement for all searches and
seizures. Under Terry, a policeman who suspects
there is criminal activity afoot may conduct a
limited protective search for concealed weapons
when he has reason to believe that the suspect is
armed and dangerous. The majority opinion of
Justice Rehnquist in Adams, joined in by the Chief
Justice and Justices White, Powell, and Black-
mun, extended Terry to situations in which a
policeman's belief concerning criminal activity
and dangerousness of the suspect are based upon
information obtained from an informant.
I fully appreciate that the lot of a policeman
in these troubled times is not a happy one. The
search conducted in Adams, however, was carried
out pursuant to information supplied by an un-
known informer, not shown to have been reliable,
and who gave no information which demonstrated
any personal knowledge of the situation. Further-
more, the informant's tip was uncorroborated.
In such circumstances, a warrant could not have
7 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. at 489 (opinion of the
Court).
407 U.S. 143 (1972).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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been validly issued.74 There is a great danger in
legitimating stops and frisks without any probable
cause. Indeed, such a result is inconsistent with
Justice Powell's opinion in United States v. United
States District Court," in which he placed con-
siderable emphasis on obtaining a warrant.
I repeat in summation that some forward steps
were taken by the Court this Term in the criminal
law area. However, it must be said that the change
in the Court's personnel did have the effect in
other instances of contracting fundamental rights
and, in several cases, of not extending funda-
mental rights to the full sweep of the guiding con-
stitutional guarantees. To recapitulate, the right
to an attorney at a pre-indictment lineup was
denied by the Court in a five-four vote in which
the four recent appointees all cast their votes with
the majority. In another five-four case, the Court
held that there is no right, in a state court, to a
unanimous jury verdict. Again, the four new ap-
pointees voted with the majority. Further, the
right to a voluntariness hearing was not extended,
as it logically should have been by the Court-this
time by the deciding vote of a Warren Court Jus-
tice. Instead of requiring an evidentiary standard
of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" to the de-
termination by a trial judge of the voluntariness
of a defendant's confession, a majority of the
Court established a "preponderance of the evi-
dence" test. In this four-three decision, both new
appointees who participated in the consideration
of the case voted with the majority.
It is interesting to compare the results of the
Court's criminal law decisions with some of the
Court's holdings in other areas of the law. There
were similarly some advances in the protection of
fundamental rights, but, at the same time, there
were several substantial retreats from previously
established positions. The greatest expansion came
in the voting area. A Texas statute which imposed
filing fees of such magnitude that numerous candi-
dates were precluded from filing was held to be
an unconstitutional denial of equal protection of
the law by the State of Texas. In its unanimous
74 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), requires
that while the government may rely on hearsay in-
formation from an informant in applying for a search
warrant, the application must set forth underlying
circumstances to allow the magistrate to independently
judge the validity of the informant's conclusion and the
informant must be shown to be reliable. If these condi-
tions are not met, the government must provide corrob-
oration for the informant's conclusion. Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
75 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
opinion in Bullock v. Carter,6 the Court pointed
out that since the fees fell with unequal weight
on candidates and their supporters according to
the candidates' ability to pay the fees, the state
was required to come forth with compelling reasons
for imposing them, not merely some rational basis.
This Texas did not do. L, so deciding, the Court
properly applied what has been called the "new
equal protection": when a suspect criterion (e.g.,
wealth or race) is used by a state to discriminate
against certain individuals, or a fundamental right
is involved (voting in this case), the state must
show a compelling state objective or the discrimi-
nation will not be tolerated. A rational basis alone
for the discrimination will not suffice.
The other voting case handled by the Court
this term resulted in a Tennessee one-year residency
requirement being struck down as an unconstitu-
tional denial of equal protection. The majority
in Dunn v. Blumstein,17 through Justice Marshall,
held that, absent a compelling state interest, a
state may not burden the right to travel (a funda-
mental right) by penalizing those bona fide resi-
dents who have recently traveled from one juris-
diction to another by denying them the right to
vote (a fundamental right). Although Tennessee
had an obvious interest in preserving the purity
of the ballot box, a 30-day residency requirement
would have adequately protected the electoral
process, according to the majority. Justice Black-
mun concurred, noting that he did not consider
the Court to be holding that every state must
have no greater than a 30-day residency require-
ment, but that the constitutionality of a 35, 45
or 75-day requirement, for example, was left to
the future. Chief Justice Burger dissented.
The first amendment's free exercise clause
prevailed over Wisconsin's interest in seeking
universal education in Wisconsin v. Yoder. s In
writing for a nearly unanimous Court (Justice
Douglas dissented in part), the Chief Justice held
that the Amish need not comply with Wisconsin's
compulsory formal education requirement after
the eighth grade, because to comply would gravely
endanger, if not destroy, the free exercise of their
religious beliefs. The Chief Justice took cognizance
of the fact that the Amish had a long history as
a successful and self-sufficient segment of American
society and that they deni..-ated the sincerity
of their religious beliefs. Further, they carried
76 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
- 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
" 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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the burden of demonstrating the adequacy of their
alternative mode of continuing informal vocational
education in terms of the overall interests that
the state advanced in support of its program of
compulsory high school education. This result
seems entirely praiseworthy.
In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety CoY the
Court, over Justice Rehnquist's lone dissent, up-
held the right of illegitimate children to share in
an award under a state Workmen's Compensation
statute. This is a slight expansion of the Court's
holdina in Levy v. Louisiaa80 which extended
similar rights to illegitimates under state wrongful
death statutes. Justice Rehnquist in dissent states
that, save for racial issues, the doctrines of "funda-
mental rights," "suspect criteria," and "compelling
state interests" have no place in a decision con-
cerning the equal protection clause of the four-
teefith amendment. The upholding of such a view
would represent a reversion to a concept of the
fourteenth amendment without any support in
the opinions of the Court since before the turn of
the century. I venture to say that it will not gain
any adherents in the Court and will not be further
pursued by its author.
In Wright v. Council of The City of Emporia,81
the Court held, by a five-four vote, that because
the effect .of the "town" of Emporia withdrawing
itself from the surrounding County of Greenville,
and becoming a city, was to substantially increase
the proportion of whites attending the city schools
and blacks attending the county schools, the
withdrawal and concurrent realignment of school
districts was in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause. This seems to be
strictly in keeping with the rationale of Brown v.
Board of RdueationP and its progeny. However,
this decision is in one major aspect vastly different
from Brown and all other racial discrimination
cases since Brown. For the first time since Brown,
the Court was divided on the constitutionality
of racial discrimination accomplished through state
action: the Chief justice and Justices Blackmun,
Reinquist, and Powell dissented from the majority
opinion. This division in the Court on a racial
issue is most regrettable.
In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,n the Court,
over the dissents of Justices Douglas, Marshall,
406 U.S. 164 (1972).
391 U.S. 68 (1968).
81407 U.S. 451 (1972).
349 U.S. 299 (1955).
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
and Brennan, held that the granting of a liquor
license by a state to a social club which bars blacks
from admittance to the dub, as members or guests,
was not enough government entanglement in the
discrimination to become state action and thus
unconstitutional. The majority held that the State
of Pennsylvania, by granting the liquor license,
did not become a partner in the club's enterprise.
In my mind, the dissenters dealt more realistically
with the issue. There is no question that the states
normally strictly limit the number of liquor li-
censes granted by them. This pervasive state
regulation of the liquor industry, with the continual
supervision of virtually every detail of the opera-
tion of a licensee's business, surely has the effect
of intertwining the state in the sordid business of
racial discrimination, when one of its licensees
engages in such practices.
Another contraction of fundamental rights re-
sulted from the Court's decision in Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner.4 The respondents, who had sought to
distribute handbills in opposition to the Vietnam
war, in the interior mall area of petitioner's large,
privately owned shopping center, were denied
this right by the Court, on the grounds that there
was no state action and therefore no state denial
of any first amendment rights. The majority dis-
tinguished this case from Amalgamated Food Em-
ployees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.85 in
which the Court had held that a shopping center
was like a "business district," its operations thus
being state action, on the basis that in Logan Valley
the demonstrators were exercising first amendment
rights directly related to the operations. of the
shopping center. This is not a distinction made
in Logan Valley, nor is it a valid basis upon which
to deny individual's first amendment rights. The
four new appointees plus Justice White comprised
the majority. The dissenters noted that the shop-
ping center involved in the case at bar was as
much, if not more, an integral part of the sur-
rounding community as was the Logan Valley
Plaza shopping center.
8 6
In Cole v. Ridtardson the Court upheld a Massa-
chusetts loyalty oath required to be taken by all
state employees. The oath, in part, required "the
opposition to the overthrow of the government
84 07 U.S. 551 (1972).
88391 U.S. 308 (1968).8 Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (state
cannot criminally punish person who distributes litera-
ture in company owned town, contrary to owner's
desire).
405 U.S. 676 (1972).
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of the United States or Massachusetts by force,
violence or any illegal or unconstitutional method."
Such an oath had never before been sanctioned
by the Court. Indeed, as Justice Douglas accurately
observed in his dissent, past decisions have pro-
hibited a state from forbidding the "advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action."83 Justices Marshall and
Brennan also dissented. In fairness to the ma-
jority, it must be noted that they have attempted
to interpret the oath as nothing more than a reit-
eration of the often sanctioned oath "to uphold
and defend the Constitution." However, this de-
cision would appear to be somewhat of a contrac-
tion of fundamental first amendment rights, for
there is no assurance that the states will heed such
an interpretation, with the result being a potential
chilling effect on state employees' first amendment
rights.
Two other cases seem to me to look backward
rather than forward. Justice White, in an opinion
joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Black-
mun, Powell and Rehnquist, held, in Branzburg v.
Hayes,89 that the first amendment does not afford
a newspaperman a constitutional privilege to with-
hold facts relevant to a grand jury's investigation
of a crime, or to conceal the criminal conduct of
his source of evidence thereof. There is no question
that this decision will have an adverse effect on
what newspapermen decide to publish in the future.
As a consequence of newspapermen's fear of being
forced to expose confidential sources, the public
will be denied their right to hear and be heard.
As a realistic matter, there will be a contraction
of first amendment rights.
In Sierra Club v. Morton, 0 the issue involved
was the standing of a conservationist group to
oppose the commerical development of Mineral
King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest. Al-
though the club had a long history of a special
interest in the conservation and sound maintenance
of the national parks, game refuges, and forests
of our country, the Court held that absent a show-
ing of personalized injury, economic or otherwise,
to the club's members as individuals, the club
itself had no standing to attack the proposed
project. The club, therefore, would have had stand-
89 Id. at 688, quoting from Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
89 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
90 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
ing to represent its members' interest in the en-
vironment, if they had alleged that some or all of
its members used Mineral King. The majority
noted that the public interest does have a place
in such proceedings, and may be raised by any
plaintiff who has first shown some individualized
harm.
A more realistic view, I believe, was taken by
Justice Blackmun in dissent.9' He noted that if
such clubs were not allowed to protect the public's
interest in the environment, as a practical matter,
who would? This argument may be extended beyond
environmental issues and it may be asked, who
will protect the public's interest in many other
matters concerning governmental action in which
individualized harm is difficult to establish.12Justice
Blackmun does not go so far as to say he would
permit all types of public interest suits, without
any showing of individualized injury, but he does
say that our traditional notions of standing should
be imaginatively expanded to enable the Sierra
Club, with its bona fide and well recognized at-
tributes and purposes in the environmental area,
to litigate environmental issues. I have long been
of the view that the whole concept of standing
should be expanded to permit litigation to protect
the public interest by anyone or any group who
can display a true adversary interest and thus
will adequately present and argue the interest
involved.
CONCLUSION
In writing for the Court in Escobedo93 I said,
"[N]o system of criminal justice can, or should,
survive if it comes to depend for its continued
effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through
unawareness of their constitutional rights.... If
the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart
the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement,
then there is something very wrong with that
system." 94 Though no longer on the Bench, I have
91 Id. at 755-60. Justice Douglas also dissented and
stated that he shared Justice Blackmun's view. Justice
Brennan concurred in the second part of Justice Black-
mun's dissent. Justice Rehnquist took no part in the
decision.912 An example of such a situation is the granting of
tax benefits to a certain class of persons by the Treasury
Department. See Common Cause v. Connally, Civ.
No. 1337-71 (D.D.C., plaintiff's motion for voluntary
dismissal granted, Jan. 13, 1972), in which consumer
advocate Ralph Nader, as a representative of the public
interest in tax reform, attempted to attack the Treas-
ury's ADR Regulations.
91 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
9' Id. at 490.
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